Friday 31 May 2013

HILLARY CLINTON AND THE BENGHAZI COVER-UP



TEL AVIV – A Library of Congress report that received almost no media attention detailed – one month before the deadly Sept. 11 attack in Benghazi – how al-Qaida established a major base of operations in Libya in the aftermath of the U.S.-NATO campaign that deposed Muammar Gaddafi and his secular regime.
The report documented al-Qaida and affiliated organizations were establishing terrorist training camps and pushing Taliban-style Islamic law in Libya while the new, Western-backed Libyan government incorporated jihadists into its militias.
The document named Benghazi as a new central headquarters for al-Qaida activities.
“Al-Qaeda adherents in Libya used the 2011 Revolution to establish well-armed, well-trained, and combat-experienced militias,” stated the report.
The report also said a terrorist released from the U.S. Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba became the leader of the AL-Qaida-affiliate Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya, which espoused anti-Western ideology.
The Martyrs of 17 February Brigade, which was hired by the State Department to protect the U.S. facility in Benghazi, operates under the Ansar-Al-Sharia banner.
The document said scores of Islamic extremists were freed from Libyan prison after the U.S.-supported revolution in Libya.
The August 2012 document was prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under an inter-agency agreement with the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office’s Irregular Warfare Support Program. It may shed new light on the terrorism threat in Libya leading up to the assaults on the U.S. facility and CIA annex in Benghazi.
Despite the growing al-Qaida activity, the U.S. facilities in Benghazi remained poorly protected.
While al-Qaida and other extremist groups were establishing their new headquarters in Libya, the Obama administration reportedly was eager to declare the U.S.-NATO campaign there a victory.
According to testimony by the No. 2 U.S. official in Tripoli, who served under murdered Ambassador Christopher Stevens, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wanted the Benghazi facility turned into a permanent post ahead of her scheduled December 2012 visit to the country. A looming funding deadline may have been the reason that Stevens went to the compound the day of the attacks, the whistle blower charged.

Terrorist training camps
The report shows how various al-Qaida groups, including Al-Qaida Senior Leadership (AQSL) and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have sought to take advantage of the downfall of Gaddafi to “create a safe haven and possibly to extend their area of operations to Libya.”
AQSL in Pakistan issued strategic guidance to followers in Libya and
elsewhere to take advantage of the Libyan rebellion. Specifically, instructions were given to gather weapons, establish training camps, establish an Islamic state, and institute Shariah, the document relates.
At the time of the report’s release, al-Qaida’s clandestine network in Libya was “in an expansion phase, running training camps and media campaigns on social-media platforms.”
The Libyan revolution “may have created an environment conducive to jihad and empowered the large and active community of Libyan jihadists, which is known to be well connected to international jihad,” the document stated.
The Library of Congress report said Ansar al-Sharia, led by Sufian Ben Qhumu, a former Guantanamo detainee, has increasingly embodied al-Qaida’s presence in Libya.
Qhumu, formerly a driver for Osama bin Laden, was released by the U.S. in 2007 and was transferred to a Libyan prison where he remained until being freed in a 2010 amnesty deal.

Shariah confab
The report noted AQSL’s strategic goals remain “restoration of the caliphate, instituting sharia, and ending the Western presence in Muslim lands.”
“Al-Qaeda’s primary goal in Libya is to establish an Islamic emirate as part of its overall objective to reestablish the caliphate,” the report said.
“The al-Qaeda clandestine network in Libya is most likely espousing a Taliban-like religious orientation that calls for strict adherence to the practice and principles of Islam as interpreted by radical clerics.”
From June 7 to 8, 2012, there was a gathering of groups supporting Shariah openly held at Liberation Square in Benghazi. The event was hosted by Ansar al-Sharia and reportedly attended by at least 15 militias, including al-Qaida-affiliated organizations.

Libyan government and al-Qaida
The report noted the July 2012 elections in Libya “failed to generate a strong and unified national leadership that could address the chronic insecurity posed by the multiplicity of local militias, which al-Qaeda’s clandestine network has probably infiltrated.”
Further, the Western-backed National Transitional Council in Libya “never fully controlled the rebel movement.”
Following the 2012 elections, the Libyan army and police have reconstituted their ranks “by incorporating whole militias regardless of the militants’ background.”

Hillary eager to declare victory
While al-Qaida and other Islamic groups gained major ground in Libya following U.S. intervention there, Clinton worked plans for a symbolic victory in Benghazi, according to congressional testimony by Gregory Hicks, the former State Department deputy chief of mission and chargĂ© d’affairs who was in Libya at the time of the attack.
Under questioning from Rep. James Lankford, R-Okla., Hicks explained: “According to [Ambassador] Chris [Stevens], Secretary Clinton wanted Benghazi converted into a permanent constituent post. Timing for this decision was important. Chris needed to report before Sept. 30, the end of the fiscal year, on the physical and the political and security environment in Benghazi to support an action memo to convert Benghazi from a temporary facility to a permanent facility.”
Hicks revealed the directive came from the State Department Office of Near Eastern Affairs, headed by Acting Assistant Secretary Beth Jones. Money was available to be transferred to Benghazi from a State Department fund set aside for Iraq available, provided the funds transfer had been done by Sept. 30.
He further testified that in May 2012, during a meeting Clinton, Stevens promised he would give priority to making sure the U.S. facility at Benghazi was transformed into a permanent constituent post.
Hicks also explained Stevens wanted to make a symbolic gesture to the people of Benghazi that the United States “stood behind their dream of establishing a new democracy.”
Additionally, he wanted to have the Benghazi complex upgraded to a permanent constituent post, so Clinton could make the announcement in her planned visit to Libya before the end of 2012.
Toward the end of the hearing, the chairman, Rep. Darrell Issa, R-Calif., asked Hicks to summarize his testimony on why Stevens went to Benghazi.
“At least one of the reasons Ambassador Stevens was in Benghazi was to further the secretary’s wish that that post become a permanent constituent post and that he was also there because we understood the secretary intended to visit Tripoli later in the year,” Hicks reiterated. “We hoped that she would be able to announce to the Libyan people the establishment of a permanent constituent post in Benghazi at that time.”
Clinton and the U.S. diplomatic staff in Libya reportedly were aware of the terrorist camps in Benghazi. Fox News reported last year the U.S. mission in Benghazi convened an “emergency meeting” in August 2012 to discuss the training camps.
The news network obtained a government cable addressed to Clinton’s office stating the U.S. diplomats in Libya were briefed “on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi … these groups ran the spectrum from Islamist militias, such as the QRF Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia, to ‘Takfirist thugs.’”

Thursday 30 May 2013

Special Forces from Russia already in Syria


DAMASCUS, Syria – They are known as the Zaslon Special Forces Unit attached to Russian SVR, or Foreign Intelligence service, according to reports fro Joseph Farah's G2 bulletin.

Zaslon meaning "shield" was established in 1998 to perform covert missions abroad fromhostage rescues to assassinations and whatever other SVR operations may be under way in the world.

It is said to be well equipped as the legendary Alfa and Vympel Russian commandos and trained for all contingencies.

Its personnel are on duty around the clock and don't inform other Russian Special services of their missions.
The highly secret unit completely shuns publicity. Consequently, not much is known about their members, who are said to number around 280 men.

Now, sources within Syria say elements of the unit have been dispatched to that country. The Zaslon units may have been sent to guard Russian nationals, including the Russian embassy in Damascus.

The unit also is prepared to escort Russian and high level Syrian government officials out of Syria and is prepared to destroy sensitive documents and high technology equipment if the rebels advance on Damascus and cannot be halted by Syrian military troops.

The Russians do not want their military technology or sensitive documents captured. They certainly would be of utmost interest to Western intelligence services.

In preparing for the worst in Syria, Moscow reportedly has dispatched a small Russian naval force into the Mediterranean Sea with a contingent of 300 naval infantry marines as well as empty troopships which may be on hand to evacuate Russian nationals.

Most likely, any Russian evacuation would be through the Russian naval facility at the Syrian port of Tartus.

 Dispatch of the Zaslon Special Forces unit is expected first to strengthen security at the Russian embassy in Damascus and form a security ring around the Russian military and technical advisers now in the country.

This isn’t the first time that a Zaslon unit has been dispatched to Damascus. Last year, one provided security for former SVR director Mikhail Fradkov when he visited there.

Given the mounting concern for the Jabhat al-Nusra group, an offshoot of al-Qaida from Iraq and comprised of other foreign nationals, the Zaslon unit also may be used to target key personnel within that Sunni Islamist militant group.


Courtesy: Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin


Sunday 26 May 2013

President Obama's National Security Speech

President Obama delivered remarks on national security on May 23, 2013, at National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Here is the full text of his speech:

 PRESIDENT OBAMA: Good afternoon, everybody. Please be seated.

It is a great honor to return to the National Defense University. Here at Fort McNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791, standing guard in the earliest days of the republic and contemplating the future of warfare here in the 21st century.
For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans and served as our compass through every type of change.
Matters of war and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our independence, we know a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War to our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed, and technology has evolved, but our commitment to constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end.
And with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home.
And for a moment it seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. And then on September 11th, 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us as clouds of fire and metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning.
This was a different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could.
And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I won’t review the full history. What is clear is that we quickly drove al-Qaida out of Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. And this carried significant consequences for our fight against al-Qaida, our standing in the world and, to this day, our interests in a vital region.
Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses, hardening targets, tightening transportation security, giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror. Most of these changes were sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance that we strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. And in some cases, I believe we compromised our basic values -- by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law.
So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al-Qaida, but we also sought to change its course.
We relentlessly targeted al-Qaida’s leadership. We ended the war in Iraq and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy in Afghanistan and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law and expanded our consultations with Congress.

Today Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure. Fewer of our troops are in harm’s way, and over the next 19 months they will continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing in the world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts.
Now make no mistake: Our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of experience to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard questions about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them.

And these questions matter to every American. For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war, helping to explode our deficits and constraining our ability to nation-build here at home. Our service members and their families have sacrificed far more on our behalf.
Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have left a part of themselves on the battlefield or brought the shadows of battle back home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions we are making will define the type of nation and world that we leave to our children.
So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that no nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. Neither I nor any president can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do, what we must do, is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define that strategy, we must make decisions based not on fear but on hard- earned wisdom. And that begins with understanding the current threat that we face.
Today the core of al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us.
They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They’ve not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.
Instead what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al-Qaida affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with al-Qaida’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, the most active in plotting against our homeland. And while none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of 9/11, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.
Unrest in the Arab world has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. But here too there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we continue to confront state- sponsored networks like Hezbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Other of these groups are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. And while we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. And that means we’ll face more localized threats like what we saw in Benghazi, or the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives -- perhaps in loose affiliation with regional networks -- launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations. And finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States.
Whether it’s a shooter at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin, a plane flying into a building in Texas, or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, America’s confronted many forms of violent extremism in our history. Deranged or alienated individuals, often U.S. citizens or legal residents, can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. And that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.

So that’s the current threat. Lethal, yet less capable, al-Qaida affiliates, threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad, homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our embassy in Beirut, at our Marine barracks in Lebanon, on a cruise ship at sea, at a disco in Berlin, and on a Pan Am flight, Flight 103, over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center, at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia, and at our embassy in Kenya.
These attacks were all brutal. They were all deadly. And we learned that, left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.
Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don’t arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled by a common ideology, a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims -- who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this ideology persists.
And in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas.
So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. First, we must finish the work of defeating al-Qaida and its associated forces. In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force which ensures that al-Qaida can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.



So that’s the current threat. Lethal, yet less capable, al-Qaida affiliates, threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad, homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our embassy in Beirut, at our Marine barracks in Lebanon, on a cruise ship at sea, at a disco in Berlin, and on a Pan Am flight, Flight 103, over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center, at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia, and at our embassy in Kenya.
These attacks were all brutal. They were all deadly. And we learned that, left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.
Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don’t arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled by a common ideology, a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims -- who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this ideology persists.
And in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas.
So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. First, we must finish the work of defeating al-Qaida and its associated forces. In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force which ensures that al-Qaida can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.
So that’s the current threat. Lethal, yet less capable, al-Qaida affiliates, threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad, homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our embassy in Beirut, at our Marine barracks in Lebanon, on a cruise ship at sea, at a disco in Berlin, and on a Pan Am flight, Flight 103, over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center, at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia, and at our embassy in Kenya.
These attacks were all brutal. They were all deadly. And we learned that, left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.
Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don’t arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled by a common ideology, a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims -- who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this ideology persists.
And in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas.
So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. First, we must finish the work of defeating al-Qaida and its associated forces. In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force which ensures that al-Qaida can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.

Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless global war on terror but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Already thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen, we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia, we helped a coalition of African nations push al-Shabab out of its strongholds. In Mali, we’re providing military aid to French-led intervention to push back al-Qaida in the Maghreb and help the people of Mali reclaim their future.
Much of our best counterterrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. That’s how a Somali terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in prison in New York. That;s how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom. That’s how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic. These partnerships work.

But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al- Qaida and its affiliates try to gain a foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth.
They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains.
In some of these places, such as parts of Somalia and Yemen, the state has only the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action.
And it’s also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of special forces to capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians, where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight -- with surrounding tribal communities, for example, that pose no threat to us -- times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis.
To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were immense. The likelihood of capture, although that was our preference, was remote, given the certainty that our folks would confront resistance. The fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties or embroiled in a extended firefight was a testament to the meticulous planning and professionalism of our special forces, but it also depended on some luck. And it was supported by massive infrastructure in Afghanistan.
And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership.
 
So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al-Qaida and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones. As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions about who is targeted and why, about civilian casualties and the risk of creating new enemies, about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law, about accountability and morality. So let me address these questions. To begin with, our actions are effective. Don’t take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, we could lose the reserves to enemies’ airstrikes; we cannot fight airstrikes with explosives. Other communications from al-Qaida operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al-Qaida commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.

Moreover, America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law and international law, the United States is at war with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war, a war waged proportionally, in last resort and in self-defense.
And yet as our fight enters a new phase, America’s legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance, for the same progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power, or risk abusing it.
And that’s why, over the last four years, my administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists -- insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in presidential policy guidance that I signed yesterday.
In the Afghan war theater we must, and will continue to, support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. And that means we will continue to take strikes against high-value al- Qaida targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces.
But by the end of 2014 we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we have made against core al-Qaida will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.
Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al-Qaida and its associated forces, and even then the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists. Our preference is always to detain, interrogate and prosecute them. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose. Our actions are bound by consultations with partners and respect for state sovereignty. America does not take strikes to punish individuals. We act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured, the highest standard we can set.
Now, this last point is critical because much of the criticism about drone strikes, both here at home and abroad, understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war.
And for the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their loss. For me and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred throughout conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But as commander in chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties, not just in our cities at home and our facilities abroad, but also in the very places, like Sanaa and Kabul and Mogadishu, where terrorists seek a foothold.
Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes.
So doing nothing’s not an option.
Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of conventional military options. As I’ve already said, even small special operations carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage. And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences, are difficult to contain, result in large numbers of civilian casualties and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict.
So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths, or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be more U.S. deaths, more Blackhawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.
Yes, the conflict with al-Qaida, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us, and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life.
Our efforts must also be measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed. So neither conventional military action, nor waiting for attacks to occur, offers moral safe harbor, and neither does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services and, indeed, have no functioning law.
Now, this is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign lands risks creating more enemies and impacts public opinion overseas. Moreover, our laws constrain the power of the president, even during wartime, and I’ve taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of drones strikes and the necessary secrecy often involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.
And for this reason, I’ve insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took office, my administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that: Not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes, every strike. That includes the one instance when we targeted an American citizen: Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations for AQAP.
Now, this week I authorized the declassification of this action and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims that have been made.
For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen -- with a drone or with a shotgun -- without due process. Nor should any president deploy armed drones over U.S. soil.
But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a swat team.
That’s who Anwar Awlaki was. He was continuously trying to kill people. He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. When Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber, went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, helped him tape a martyrdom video to be shown after the attack, and his last instructions were to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil.
I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot. But we couldn’t. And as president, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took him out.
Of course, the targeting of any American raises constitutional issues that are not present in other strikes, which is why my administration submitted information about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed and briefed the Congress before this strike as well.
But the high threshold that we’ve set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of every human life.
Alongside the decision to put our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups, even against a sworn enemy of the United States, is the hardest thing I do as president. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the American people.
Now, going forward, I’ve asked my administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of war zones that go beyond our reporting to Congress.
Each option has virtues in theory but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority.
Another idea that’s been suggested, the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch, avoids those problems but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decision-making without inspiring additional public confidence in the process.
But despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these and other options for increased oversight.
I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root. And in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war through drones or special forces or troop deployments will prove self- defeating and alter our country in troubling ways.
So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism, from North Africa to South Asia. As we’ve learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep-rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred. And moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and our values demand that we make the effort.
This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia and Libya, because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a rebuke to violent extremism. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements, because the end of a tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism.
We are actively working to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians because it is right and because such a peace could help reshape attitudes in the region. And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education and encourage entrepreneurship because American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with peoples’ hopes and not simply their fears.
Success on all these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures that there is -- that’s true for Democrats and Republicans; I’ve seen the polling -- even though it amounts to less than 1 percent of the federal budget. In fact, a lot of folks think it’s 25 percent if you ask people on the streets. Less than 1 percent; still, wildly unpopular.
But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security, and it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism. Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan and creating reservoirs of good will that marginalize extremists.
That has to be part of our strategy.
Moreover, America cannot carry out this work if we don’t have diplomats serving in some very dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have strengthened security at our embassies, and I am implementing every recommendation of the Accountability Review Board, which found unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I’ve called on Congress to fully fund these efforts to bolster security and harden facilities, improve intelligence and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges.
But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats will remain. This is the price of being the world’s most powerful nation, particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab world. And in balancing the trade-offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the dangers we face in the long run. And that’s why we should be grateful to those diplomats who are willing to serve there.
Targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagement and assistance -- through such a comprehensive strategy, we can significantly reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. But as we guard against dangers from abroad, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders.
As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet increase its frequency, and in some cases its lethality.
Today a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda and learn how to kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two years ago my administration did a comprehensive review and engaged with law enforcement. And the best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American community, which has consistently rejected terrorism, to identify signs of radicalization, and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence.
And these partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. In fact, the success of American Muslims, and our determination to guard against any encroachments on their civil liberties, is the ultimate rebuke to those who say that we’re at war with Islam.
Now, thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. That’s why in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement so we can intercept new types of communication, but also build in privacy protections to prevent abuse.
That means that even after Boston, we do not deport someone or throw somebody in prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints on the tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such as the state secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong privacy and civil liberties board to review those issues where our counterterrorism efforts and our values may come into tension.
You know, the Justice Department’s investigation of national security leaks offers a recent example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our security and our open society. As commander in chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy. That’s who we are. And I’m troubled by the possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government accountable.
Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must be on those who break the law. That’s why I have called on Congress to pass a media shield law to guard against government overreach. And I’ve raised these issues with the attorney general, who shares my concern. So he’s agreed to review existing Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters, and he’ll convene a group of media organizations to hear their concerns as part of that review. And I’ve directed the attorney general to report back to me by July 12th.
Now, all these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact, in sometimes unintended ways, the openness and freedom on which our way of life depends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing.
The AUMF is now nearly twelve years old. The Afghan War is coming to an end. Core al-Qaida is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al-Qaida will pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight or continue to grant presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states.
So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine and ultimately repeal the AUMF’s mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. It’s what our democracy demands.
And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects.
I’m going to repeat one more time: As a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate them. And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a military commission.
During the past decade the vast majority of those detained by our military were captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the Afghans as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law-of-war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists whenever we can.
The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening Gitmo, that detainees would not be able to challenge their detention, was found unconstitutional five years ago. In the meantime, Gitmo has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won’t cooperate with us if they think a terrorist will end up at Gitmo. During a time of budget cuts, we spend $150 million each year to imprison 166 people, almost a million dollars per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates that we must spend another 200 million (dollars) to keep Gitmo open at a time when we are cutting investments in education and research here at home and when the Pentagon is struggling is struggling with sequester and budget cuts.
As president, I have tried to close Gitmo. I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from either transferring detainees to other countries or imprisoning them here in the United States. These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530 detainees were transferred from Gitmo with Congress’ support. When I ran for president the first time, John McCain supported closing Gitmo. This was a bipartisan issue.
No person has ever escaped one of our super-max or military prisons here in the United States -- ever. Our courts have convicted hundreds of people for terrorism or terrorism-related offenses, including some folks who are more dangerous than most Gitmo detainees there in our prisons. And given my administration’s relentless pursuit of al-Qaida’s leadership, there is no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility that it should -- should have never been opened.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Excuse me, President Obama, you are the commander in chief -- (off mic) -- (applause) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Today -- so -- (sustained applause) -- so let me finish, ma’am. So today -- so today, once again, today --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic) -- for (102 ?) people -- (off mic) -- people’s rights, these desperate people -- (off mic) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: I’m about to address, ma’am, but you got -- you got to let me speak. I’m about to address it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- (off mic) -- our commander in chief --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Let me address it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Our commander in chief -- (off mic) -- Guantanamo Bay --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Why don’t you let me address it, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic.)
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Why don’t you sit down and I’ll tell you exactly what I’m going to do.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic.)
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you, ma’am. Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.) Ma’am -- thank you. You should let me finish my sentence.
Today I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers from Gitmo. I have asked -- (applause) -- I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions.
I am appointing a new senior envoy at the State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be to achieve the transfer of detainees to third countries. I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen so we can review them on a case-by-case basis.
To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries. Where we --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic) -- released every day.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and our military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee. Now --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic.)
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Ma’am, let me -- let me finish. Let me finish, ma’am.
Now, this is part of free speech, is you being able to speak, but also you listening and me being able to speak. All right? (Applause.) Thank you. (Applause.)
Now, even after we take these steps, one issue will remain, which is how to deal with those Gitmo detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or attacks but who cannot be prosecuted, for example, because the evidence against them has been compromise or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we commit to a process of closing Gitmo, I am confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.
And I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future 10 years from now or 20 years from now when the United States of America is still holding people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of land that is not a part of our country.
Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding detainees who are being held on a hunger strike. I’m willing to cut the young lady who interrupted me some slack because it’s worth being passionate about. Is this who we are? Is that something our founders foresaw? Is that the America we want to leave our children?
Our sense of justice is stronger than that. We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit, and Faisal Shahzad, who put a car bomb in Times Square. It’s in a court of law that we will try Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon.
Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, is as we speak serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison here in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, “the way we treat you is the measure of our own liberty.”
When --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, 16-year-old -- (inaudible) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: -- when we --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- killed by you?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: -- we went --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is that the way we treat a 16-year-old -- (inaudible)?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: He -- he -- he went on to --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Why was he killed?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: -- we went --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you tell us why Abdulrahman al-Awlaki was killed? Can you tell the Muslim people their lives are as precious as our lives? Can you take the drones out of the hands of the CIA? Can you stop the signature strikes that are killing people on the basis of suspicious activities?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: We’re addressing that, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) -- apologize to the thousands of Muslims that you have killed? Will you compensate the innocent family victims? That will make us safer here at home.
I love my country! I love the rule of law! The drones are making us less safe.
And keeping people in indefinite detention in Guantanamo is making us less safe. Abide by the rule of law -- (inaudible) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: You know, I think that the -- and I’m going off script, as you might expect, here. (Laughter, applause.) The -- the voice of that woman is worth paying attention to. (Applause.) Obviously -- obviously I do not agree with much of what she said, and obviously she wasn’t listening to me in much of what I said.
But these are tough issues, and the suggestion that we can gloss over them is wrong. You know, when that judge sentenced Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, he went on to point to the American flag that flew in the courtroom. “That flag,” he said, “will fly there long after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom.”
So, America, we have faced down dangers far greater than al- Qaida. By staying true to the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have overcome slavery and Civil War, and fascism, and communism. In just these last few years as president, I have watched the American people bounce back from painful recession, mass shootings, natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated Oklahoma. These events were heartbreaking; they shook our communities to the core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not come close to breaking us.
I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, “That’s my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on.”
I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing had happened.
I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the White House, wrote to us, “We have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream big and never give up because it does pay off.”
I think of all the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives and helping other vets to find jobs.
I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said: “Next year you’re going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something to be messed with.”
That’s who the American people are: determined, and not to be messed with.
And now we need a strategy and a politics that reflects this resilient spirit. Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony at a battleship or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured in parents taking their kids to school, immigrants coming to our shores, fans taking in a ballgame, a veteran starting a business, a bustling city street, a citizen shouting her concerns at a president. The quiet determination, that strength of character and bond of fellowship, that refutation of fear -- that is both our sword and our shield.
And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s memory, alongside the brutal despots and deranged madmen and ruthless demagogues who litter history, the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries, to national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom.
Thank you very much, everybody. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America.






  
 For the full text of the heckler, see:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/obama-to-heckler-part-of-free-speech-is-you-listening/2013/05/23/e626cfe0-c3d1-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_video.html 
 


Thursday 23 May 2013

Rohingya Muslims, not so different from you and I?

   On Monday, Burmese President Thein Sein is due to visit the White House. The visit represents another milestone in recently burgeoning U.S.-Burma relations, and an opportunity to engage Thein Sein on the significance of respecting international human rights norms -- such as protecting its minority Muslim population's religious freedoms -- to continued Burmese democratic reform. The country's otherwise tainted record on religious freedom, including escalating communal violence, threatens to undermine its transition from one-party, autocratic military rule to more representative governance.
It adversely impacts our global security as well.
By way of background, more than 75 percent of the world's population resides in countries where official restrictions on religious freedom prevail. Despite laudable strides toward democratic reform, Myanmar (also referred to as Burma) is among those nations. In fact, it stands out as among the world's 25 most populous nations with the most government restrictions on, and social hostilities due to, religion. Notably, Burmese religious hatred, bias and violence are frequently directed toward its Rohingya Muslim population.
Who are the Rohingya Muslims?
The U.N. has long characterized the Rohingya Muslims, a religious and ethnic minority community numbering approximately 1 million in Myanmar, as one of the world's most persecuted minorities. Anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim sentiment has long tainted the nation's political and social spheres.
During the country's more than 60-year military rule since 1962, the Burmese army committed numerous human rights violations, for instance, including killing, raping and torturing its Rohingya Muslim population culminating at times in mass expulsions (and a chronic refugee crises in neighboring Bangladesh).
Such deplorable human rights and humanitarian conditions is further exasperated by the Rohingya and other Muslims' official "statelessness." Despite the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right to a nationality, prohibiting its arbitrary deprivation, the Burmese Citizenship Act, enacted back in 1982, codified the legal exclusion of the Rohingya denying them equal citizenship rights.
To be sure, this denial of Burmese citizenship has resulted in additional injustices and inequalities, including the group's lack of access to identity documents, education and employment. It has also rendered group members vulnerable to arbitrary detention, forced labor and discriminatory taxation. The Burmese government has further restricted their rights to marry, own property and move freely -- rights guaranteed to non-citizens as well as citizens under international law.
Unfortunately, Burmese President Thein Sein remains steadfastly opposed to repealing or amending the 1982 Citizenship Act. And the plight of the Rohingya Muslims will not improve until the law is stripped of its discriminatory provisions.
Contemporary Developments
Both government officials and fellow civilians continue to persecute the Rohingya Muslims even with the country's current democratic transition since a nominally civilian government was ushered in by popular elections in March 2011.
Human rights violations not only include the denial of citizenship rights mentioned above, but also restrictions on religious freedom such as mosque constructions as well as religiously motivated violence.
Indeed, sectarian violence often perpetrated by members of the majority Buddhist population has most recently erupted in June 2012, October 2012, March 2013, April 2013; it persists and is spreading to previously unaffected areas of the country.
The violence has reaped devastating effects.
The communal violence has left approximately 13,000 people homeless. More than 120,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are living in temporary shelters with limited access to food, medical care, sanitation facilities and other types of humanitarian necessities.
Responsible Burmese officials and security forces -- who have refused to protect the Rohingya Muslims at critical moments, participated in the persecution and obstructed access to humanitarian aid -- have not been subject to prosecution. Not surprisingly, a general climate of impunity prevails as Rohingya Muslims continue to endure brutal police repression, forced conscription to perform labor, arbitrary detention, beatings, killings and mistreatment.
Why Should We Care?
Last year, we re-designated Myanmar as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act because of related pervasive violations. During President Thein Sein's visit on Monday, he must understand that the status quo arguably threatens our global security.
Recent evidence from Georgetown University suggests that state restrictions on religious freedom may contribute to violent extremism. Such repression, as described above, may radicalize targeted religious communities and/or enhance the violent message of militants abroad. While I am an ardent supporter of nonviolence even in the face of legitimate political and other grievances, it is difficult to ignore the implications here.
Burmese officials who arbitrarily arrest, detain, beat, injure and kill Rohingya Muslims may enhance the appeal of those advocating a more violent response to government repression -- perhaps within the country but also well beyond. Indeed, media outlets around the world, including segments of the Muslim and Arab world, have already begun reporting on the plight of the Rohingya Muslims in Burma.
Conversely, Georgetown's research findings suggest that enhanced religious freedom may help "moderate, contain, counteract, or prevent the origin or spread" of violent religious extremism.
Through broader U.S. engagement, communication and dialogue -- such as Monday's momentous White House meeting -- President Thein Sein must come to understand the underlying significance of religious freedom to enhanced global security. He must understand that continued Burmese persecution of the minority faith community may contribute to violent extremism by inadvertently promoting its appeal.
Further, violent extremists elsewhere will manipulate those incidents of persecution to serve a more nefarious, violent narrative to recruit others to their abhorrent cause. The implications are far-reaching.
What We Should Do
Notably, the U.S. has expended more than $24 million in humanitarian aid to help address the suffering in Myanmar. But in the current climate of fiscal austerity, such levels of financial aid, even for humanitarian purposes, cannot be reasonably sustained.
Moreover, sanctions have proven grossly ineffective largely because of the willingness of other countries in the region to continue trading with Myanmar for their own economic and other strategic self-interest.
Potential solutions? What if we attempted to address the underlying causes of the communal strife and violence.
As an initial, necessary measure the Burmese should eliminate the discriminatory provisions of the 1982 Citizenship Act rendering the Rohingya Muslims "stateless." Statelessness deprives the Rohingya of equal protection under the law and facilitates additional injustices, thus contributing to increased likelihood of sectarian and other destabilizing conflict.
Burmese officials should adopt pluralism as an ideal model allowing for greater inclusivity of all of its religious and ethnic minorities. Formal inclusion of the Rohingya and other Muslims into the public and political spheres provides a nonviolent means to making a meaningful contribution to society thereby contributing to our global security.
Moreover, the sociological consequence of religious pluralism is a general recognition and acceptance of all faiths practiced by diverse groups. Arguably, this represents an ideal model for a diverse country like Myanmar.
It is significant to note that while there does not appear to be any current evidence of violent radicalization among the Rohingya or other Muslims in Myanmar, guarding against the phenomenon (there and abroad) is a critical consideration in light of the continuing Global War on Terror (GWOT).
By protecting religious freedom and conferring citizenship rights upon the Rohingya, the Burmese will continue its effective transition toward democracy. Unfortunately, the persistent waves of violence otherwise threaten to undermine its progress as well as global security. President Thein Sein should walk away from Monday's meeting at the White House with that realization.

Wednesday 22 May 2013

For the SAA in Syria, Why is Al-Qusayr important?



AL-QUSAYR is a small city with a population of between 30,000 and 50,000 about 9 km from the northeastern border of Lebanon. It is also 22 km southwest of Homs. Due to it’s proximity to Lebanon, Al-Qusayr is an attractive position for militant groups trafficking arms and personnel. Al-Qusayr is a strategic link between Damascus, the coast, and Homs, Hama and Aleppo to the north. Since March, the Syrian army has been on the offensive, securing key areas in Aleppo, Damascus countryside, Dara’a and Homs. The primary objective of these pinpoint operations is the disruption and eliminating of supply lines from neighbouring countries, a lifeline enabling militant groups to continue their attrition against Syrian army installations such as airbases. In Rif Dimashq (Damascus countryside) specifically, militant organisations intensified attempts to disrupt life in Damascus with regular mortar and rocket attacks, and occasional car bombs.

Following a stunning deployment of artillery and air power on May 19th, Syrian forces and it’s allied guerrilla detachments of the National Defense Forces (NDF) and Hezbollah stormed Al-Qusayr. Within the first day, the center of the city was secured following the witnessing of the church having been destroyed by militants – Al-Qusayr has a significant Christian population.

According to my source, the greatest challenge for Syrian troops and it’s guerrilla allies are Chechen militants and entrenched, well trained snipers.


Underlining the logistical and strategic importance of the city, insurgents were reported to be well armed and consistently firing hundreds of rounds a minute while deploying mortars and rocket propelled grenades. During the day, 20th May, the Syrian army were reported to have control over 60% of the city. Since then, their advance has been reported as slow, but significant as the role of aircraft and armored units became more limited, presenting infantry with the objective of fighting in a heavily built-up area.
Significantly, the Syrian command left the Northern gateway out of the city wide open. Initially, this was the corridor for civilians who were urged to evacuate in the days and weeks before the assault. Little is known about the motive for such a decision, but it is highly likely that this is in order to draw adversaries into open ground to allow for accurate targeting and eventual defeat of armed militants who will have expended supplies during their encirclement. Indeed, a split between two groups emerged following the near total encirclement of the city – those who wanted to fight to the death and those who wanted to evacuate the city in anticipation of a saturating Syrian army assault on the city.


As of today, the situation remains slow but steady. The various army brigades involved in the multi-directional assault on the city are converging in the south of the city, readying for an assault on the west. The battle is not over and what will become of the remaining adversaries in the northern corridor of the city remains to be seen.
After the Battle of Al-Qusayr, a map posted by Syrian Perspective‘s source, which sheds light on Syrian army strategy. As noted, Al-Qusayr’s surrounding areas were subject to a build-up and eventual encirclement of Syrian troops and allies. Northwest of the city, the villages of Al-Hamidiyah and Al-Haydariya were secured – completing a chain around insurgent positions and entrenchments. It is expected that militant groups will be fully encircled, sieged and eliminated in order to secure Homs governate (province) in it’s entirety. 



The army’s strategy of securing important cities, towns and other populated centres while placing less emphasis on isolated rural positions, has paid off. It is possible that the army and it’s allies will fully secure the west of the country and move west in an effort to confront Al-Qaeda and other factions which are particularly active in that region.

Take note of surrounding positions of Hama city, including Talbiseh and Rastan.

From predictions of Syrian army collapse to increasing victories on the ground reports of new counter-insurgency strategies in early 2013 appears to have paid off, with a clear increase in morale for Syrian troops. Reports from Damascus indicate an increasingly confident administration. More recently, Russia’s transfer of advanced P-800 Onyx/Yakhonts anti-ship missiles underline Moscow’s position on the conflict – one which is against foreign intervention.


Yakhonts anti-ship missile with a range of up to 300 km. Syria’s possession of upgraded missiles will reportedly thwart plans for a naval blockade and no-fly zone

A marked re-calibration in Syrian army methodology can be traced back to the latter weeks of 2012, where reports of “opposition victories” were attributed to the overrunning and capture of insignificant, isolated Syrian army positions and installations. In fact, reports suggest that military strategists have decided against the defence of strategically unimportant outposts, in favour of an operational consolidation of manpower and equipment in order to pursue direct confrontation with militant organisations.

Consideration of the Syrian army’s historically based Soviet military doctrine from the years of President Hafez al-Assad and the close relationship between the Soviet Union and recently Russia is important. Russian lessons of a costly war in Chechnya and the resulting defeat of Jihadist militants groups are key to gaining more understanding of Syrian rationale in dealing with entrenched and oftentimes elusive militant groups. Additionally, the Soviet era military hardware has had many opportunities to present it’s defects as well as advantages.

The Syrian Air Force inventory includes aging but reliable Sukhoi combat jets.

The Syrian army, ill-prepared for an asymmetrical, foreign equipped and funded militant onslaught, has proved remarkably resilient. Despite crucial military hardware being of age, the reliable nature of vehicles and aircraft coupled with well trained personnel has enabled the Syrian armed forces to turn strategy into success. Indeed, the Western media narrative has performed a stunning u-turn of army having it’s days numbered, having it’s back broken with defections and close to collapse. Absent from the reporting of Western media outlets, often quoting alleged experts, is accurate reports of the Syrian army’s doctrinal order of battle – living up to the reputation of one of the best trained and equipped army’s in the region.

Worth considering also, is the army’s breaking of two much reported sieges of Wadi al-Deif and Hamidiya outside Maarat al-Numan in mid-April. Airdrops to the installations were naturally discontinued, allowing greater employment of air power to other important flashpoints.

President Hafez AL-Assad emphasis on the maintenance of a well disciplined and competent military have survived. Calibrated with Russian lessons of the Chechnya conflict and Hezbollah’s combat experience, effectiveness and asymmetrical tactics, the Syrian army is living up to it’s reputation as a logistically and cohesive force.


 











 

Tuesday 21 May 2013

What you didnt know about the Yakhont Missile...

Russia made its intentions known to everyone by fulfilling the contracts it has with Syria. And if you didnt know what the Yakhont missile can do, here are my findings...






The Russian Sizzler aka Sunburn/Yakhont/Onyx and now Brahmos missile flies farther than any western anti-ship missile. It can go 300 km and it maneuvers. It can be fired on one side of an island, the curve around the island to avoid detection. It can be fired towards what is thought to be the target and then instantly change course for the real target. It can come into its target weaving to avoid being shot down. It flies below the radar and adjusts for its surroundings with the ability to move through foliage and buildings. For the last dozen kilometres, it sprints at three times the speed of sound.



Russia has exported it to China, which is upgrading it. Its also been exported to India, Vietnam and Singapore. Syria and Algeria have both the older Onyx version and an updated Yakhont. Iran has them, known as Sunburn. They can be fired from Iran's Kilo-class submarines, which are also made by Russia. Iran and Syria can set up batteries of Sizzlers in trucks along the Persian Gulf, which would be difficult to knock out or even locate if they're moving around. They're asymmetric in the sense that it is easier to sink a warship than defend one. If a state can get these, they will have the greatest amountof underdog firepower in history.


It should be noted that as of now, Western forces do not have any system thatcould could successfully engage or intercept the Yakhont Missile.


Writings by:
Simon Wayne...